Motivated by the cost and disruption involved in changing from a two-finger to a ten-finger biometric system for matching U.S. visitors to a watchlist of criminals and terrorists, we investigate whether any two-finger multistage biometric strategies would fix the inadequate matching performance of poorquality prints that plagues the U.S. Government's original two-finger, single-stage biometric system.
Abstract
Motivated by the cost and disruption involved in changing from a two-finger to a ten-finger biometric system for matching U.S. visitors to a watchlist of criminals and terrorists, we investigate whether any two-finger multistage biometric strategies would fix the inadequate matching performance of poorquality prints that plagues the U.S. Government's original two-finger, single-stage biometric system.
For several multistage strategies, we solve the Stackelberg game in which the U.S. Government chooses the biometric threshold levels to maximize the detection probability subject to constraints on the false positive probability and on the mean time per visitor to perform biometric screening, and the terrorist chooses the fingerprint image quality to minimize his detection probability. The first stage of all the strategies uses the current minutiae-based fingerprint matching system, but with thresholds that depend on image quality, which in isolation achieves a detection probability of 0.771. Using face recognition (based on 2002 data) in the second stage increases the detection probability to 0.841, whereas using a slower and more thorough texture-based fingerprint matcher in the second stage leads to a detection probability of at least 0.913 and perhaps significantly higher (data for the texture matcher is only available for the poorest quality prints and we assume this is its performance for all prints). Adding face recognition as a third stage to this latter system does not improve performance. The two-finger, two-stage strategy may be comparable in performance to the ten-finger, single-stage strategy (which has a detection probability of 0.937), is robust against gaming and poor image acquisition, requires no additional hardware, and would generate no visible changes from the original two-finger, single-stage system from a visitor's viewpoint.
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I. INTRODUCTION The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program takes two
index fingerprints from first-time foreign visitors (at visa enrollment or at U.S. ports of entry) and assigns a pair of similarity scores, one for each index finger, against the corresponding prints of several million criminals and suspected terrorists on the biometric watchlist. If the left or right finger score exceeds a threshold, or the sum of the left and right scores exceeds a second threshold, then the corresponding watchlist person is placed on the visitor's candidate list. If a visitor's candidate list is nonempty at the completion of the matching process, then he is further investigated during a secondary inspection. The average performance of this fingerprint-matching strategy is impressive: the detection probability, which is the likelihood that a visitor who is on the watchlist is correctly placed on his own candidate list, is 0.959, and the false positive probability, which is the likelihood that a visitor who is not on the watchlist has a nonempty candidate list, is 0.0031 for a watchlist of six million [1] . However, its accuracy depends greatly on the image quality of the fingerprints, which is computed during the matching process. For the current eightpoint quality scheme, the detection probability for the worst image quality (quality 8), which includes approximately 5% of the visiting population and 10% of the watchlist population, is only 0.526 [1] , [2] . This quality-dependent degradation represents a serious vulnerability that can be exploited by terrorist organizations, which can choose U.S.-bound operatives that have poor image quality.
Consequently, we solved a Stackelberg game [3] in which the U.S. Government chooses a biometric strategy to maximize the detection probability and then the terrorist chooses his image quality to minimize the detection probability [2] . Using different threshold pairs (one for the similarity score of each index finger and one for the sum) for different image qualities, this approach generates a detection probability of 0.733 for all image qualities, thereby providing a more robust system, but with worse average performance [2] . Allowing up to ten fingers to be used increases the detection probability to 0.949 for all visitors [2] . Although a shift from a two-finger system to a ten-finger system would be costly and disruptive, on July 11, 2005 Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff announced this change in policy for first-time visitors (http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4598); implementation of this change is currently in progress.
Using this Stackelberg game formulation, here we optimize several multistage strategies that employ only the biometrics originally (i.e., pre-July 2005) acquired in the US-VISIT process: a facial image and two fingerprints. We employ three biometric matching systems to construct these multistage strategies: the fingerprint matching system currently used in the US-VISIT Program [1] , [2] , which is based on comparing minutiae such as ridge bifurcations or ridge endings, a face recognition system based on a 2002 vendor test [4] (more recent developments are mentioned in the Discussion), and a slower but more thorough texture-based fingerprint matching algorithm, which models the ridge flow patterns on a fingerprint using partial differential equations [5] (see [6] for a different texture-based approach). We refer to these biometric matching systems as Minutiae, Face and Texture, respectively. October 10, 2006 DRAFT II. THE MODEL Biometric software systems compute similarity scores between any two biometric samples (e.g., fingers or faces). The two performance measures for biometric systems are the detection probability and the false positive probability, which are derived in our mathematical model (the detailed mathematical formulation and the parameter estimates are derived in the Appendix) from the probability distributions of the intraperson similarity scores (i.e., the score from matching two different biometric samples from the same person) and the interperson similarity scores (i.e., the score from matching biometric samples from two different people), respectively. For Face, we need a single intraperson distribution and a single interperson distribution. In our mathematical model, each U.S. visitor and each person on the watchlist has an associated integer-valued fingerprint image quality that varies between 1 (best quality) and 8 (worst quality); see [2] for a justification of this assumption. Consequently, we need eight intraperson distributions for Minutiae and eight for Texture. We assume that an interperson similarity score depends on the qualities of the two matched fingerprints only through the worse of these two qualities (this assumption is justified in [7] ), and hence only eight interperson distributions are needed for Minutiae and another eight for Texture. Parameters for the eight gamma intraperson distributions and eight lognormal interperson distributions were derived in [2] for Minutiae. The similarity scores generated by Minutiae and Texture for any two fingers are statistically dependent, and for analytical tractability we model these pairs of scores by bivariate lognormal random variables for both intraperson and interperson, and hence we do not re-use the gamma intraperson Minutiae parameters derived in [2] . The only existing reliable Texture data is for 309 prints of quality 8 [5] , and so we only estimate the quality-8 intraperson and interperson distributions for Texture.
For lack of data, the correlation between Texture and Minutiae is indirectly estimated from the correlation between Texture and Cogent's next-generation minutiae-based matcher, which is superior to Minutiae but still based on the same technology. All Minutiae and Texture parameter values appear in Tables 2 and 3 of the Appendix, along with the probability mass function of the image quality of visitors and watchlist people. We also have data on the performance of Minutiae on the same set of 309 Cogent prints, which allows us to compare the quality of the Cogent prints to the quality-8 prints used to generate the results in [1] , [2] . [4] , and following [2] , we assume the intraperson distribution is gamma and the interperson distribution is lognormal. Fig. 1 . A graphical description of the Minutiae-Face and Minutiae-Texture strategies. The similarity scores between the visitor and the watchlist person are (s1, s2) for the two fingers in Minutiae, s f for Face, and (s1,s2) for the two fingers in Texture. The subscript i refers to the image quality of the fingerprint match between the visitor and the watchlist person, which is the worse of the two qualities. Stage one uses the Minutiae system currently in use in the US-VISIT Program. The Minutiae biometric rule is the quality-dependent two-finger strategy proposed in [2] with parameters t11, . . . , t18, t21, . . . , t28, where " Ë " denotes "logical or". The second stage of the Minutiae-Face strategy uses the Identix face recognition system with fingerprint quality-dependent thresholds (u1, . . . , u8) in its second stage. The second stage of the Minutiae-Texture strategy uses the Texture fingerprint system with a biometric rule that has the same form as the Minutiae rule in the first stage, with thresholds u11, . . . , u18, u21, . . . , u28.
For lack of data, we set u11 = · · · = u17 = u21 = · · · = u27 = 0, so that Texture is only used on matches of image quality 8.
We consider three multistage biometric strategies, which are referred to as hyphenated versions of the three biometric matching systems. The Minutiae-Face and Minutiae-Texture strategies are described in Fig. 1 . The first (i.e., Minutiae) stage of both of these strategies employs the twofinger quality-dependent thresholds proposed in [2] rather than the quality-independent thresholds currently in use. We impose two restrictions on these strategies to ensure that no additional staffing is required and no additional visitor queueing is incurred. First, we constrain the overall false positive probability f to be no more than 3.1 × 10 −3 , which is the value for the two-finger qualityindependent strategy originally implemented in the US-VISIT Program, for a watchlist size of six million [1] . Second, we guarantee that the total time required to perform the biometric matching is less than the interview time at the port of entry: because biometric matching and the interview are performed in parallel, this requirement prevents additional visitor queueing.
Approximately 80% of non-immigrant visa holders have an interview time larger than 30 sec ( fusion (e.g., using a weighted average [6] or the Neyman-Pearson rule [10] ) of similarity scores from Minutiae and Texture.
Let d i be the detection probability for a visitor with image quality i. As in [2] , we consider a Stackelberg game [3] in which the U.S. Government chooses the biometric strategy (including the optimal threshold values) to maximize the detection probability subject to constraints on the false positive probability and the mean size of the stage-one candidate list for Texture, and then the terrorist chooses the image quality to minimize the detection probability. Let 
and, for the Minutiae-Texture and Minutiae-Face-Texture strategies,
where the maximization in (1) is carried out over the parameters in Fig. 1 , assuming a watchlist of six million people. The optimal solution to (1)-(3) has d 1 = · · · = d 8 , so that the detection probability of all visitors is the same, regardless of fingerprint image quality [2] .
III. RESULTS
To compare the three biometric systems on a common basis, we compute the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for two-finger Minutiae for each of the eight image qualities in [1] , [2] , for two-finger Texture for Cogent's 309 quality-8 images, for two-finger Minutiae Fig. 2 . The ROC plots for the three biometric matching processes. The detection probability vs. false positive probability curves for the eight qualities for Minutiae, for Texture on Cogent's quality-8 prints, for Minutiae on Cogent's quality-8 prints, and for Face. For the Minutiae and Texture curves, the ratios of the two-finger thresholds to the one-finger thresholds (
) are set equal to the ratios for the two-finger strategy in Table 1 of [2] .
for the 309 Cogent images, and for Face (Fig. 2) . Face has significantly worse performance than the Minutiae matching of quality-8 images. A comparison of the quality-8 Minutiae curves from NIST data [1] and from Cogent reveals that the Cogent quality-8 prints are of significantly worse quality than the quality-8 prints used to generate the data in [1] , [2] . Hence, we will be underestimating the performance of Texture. The Texture performance for quality-8 Cogent prints has approximately the same performance as the Minutiae matching for image qualities 6 and 7.
As benchmarks, we also consider the two-finger Minutiae strategy and the ten-finger Minutiae strategy, both with quality-dependent thresholds. The optimized versions of these strategies achieved respective detection probabilities of 0.733 and 0.949 in [2] , where intraperson similarity scores were fit to gamma distributions. In this paper, we fit the intraperson scores to lognormal distributions, which changes these detection probabilities to 0.771 and 0.937, respectively (Table I ).
The Minutiae-Face strategy achieves a detection probability of 0.841 (Table I ). The average size of the stage-one candidate list is only 0.09 for fingerprint image qualities 1, . . . , 7 and 1.97 for quality 8 ( Table 4 in the Appendix), and so Face is used sparingly. In contrast, the FaceMinutiae strategy also achieves a detection probability of 0.841, but with stage-one candidate lists of size 4-5M for qualities 1, . . . , 7 and 10 5 for quality 8. For the Minutiae-Face strategy, the majority of the false positives are incurred by quality-8 visitors and the two-finger threshold dominates (i.e., t 2i ≈ t 1i ) for image qualities 7 and 8 ( Table 4 in the Appendix).
The quality-8 version of the Minutiae-Texture strategy achieves a detection probability of 0.894 (Table I ). The average candidate list is 8195 for image quality 8 ( Table 5 in the Appendix), and so the time constraint (3) is not binding. Texture is much better than Minutiae for quality-8 matches, and generates very few false positives from this large quality-8 candidate list. The average size of the candidate list is ≈ 369 for visitors of image qualities i = 1, . . . , 7 ( Table 5 in the Appendix); nearly all fingerprints on the candidate list are of quality 8 and Texture successfully screens these candidates out. The great majority of the false positives are incurred by quality-7 visitors, which are generated by Minutiae (compare the fractions in the last two columns of Table 5 in the Appendix), implying that further improvements over 0.894 could be achieved if Texture was used for matches with image quality better than 8. The two-finger threshold dominates for the bottleneck matches, i.e., quality-7 Minutiae matches and quality-8 Texture matches. The lower-bound version of the Minutiae-Texture strategy has a detection probability of 0.913 (Table I ). The candidate lists are much larger here ( Table 6 in the Appendix), and constraint (3) is approximately binding for image qualities 6 and 7; solving this problem without constraint (3) leads to a detection probability of 0.918 but with a mean quality-7 candidate list size of 1.25 × 10 6 (data not shown), which far exceeds the 25-sec time threshold. Because of our lower bound assumption, which underestimates the performance of Texture for matches of qualities 1, . . . , 7 and assumes Texture is less effective than Minutiae for image qualities 1, . . . , 5
( for the bottleneck image qualities (6, 7 and 8).
Inserting Face between the two stages of the lower-bound version of the Minutiae-Texture strategy does not improve performance: The Face thresholds are extremely close to zero, implying that Face's detection probability and false positive probability are both very close to one, i.e., 
IV. DISCUSSION
Although Face appears to be much less effective than Texture in Fig. 2 , it provides significant improvements over the Minutiae system in isolation because its similarity scores are statistically independent of the fingerprint similarity scores. However, due to its limited capabilities, it is used sparingly in the Minutiae-Face strategy. In contrast, Texture's similarity scores are positively correlated with Minutiae's similarity scores: the correlation coefficient for the logarithmic similarity scores is 0.97 for interperson scores and 0.32 for intraperson scores ( Table 3 in the Appendix).
Although the Minutiae-Texture strategy easily outperforms the Minutiae-Face strategy, this pair of correlations limits the performance of the Minutiae-Texture strategy, which is based on an intersection rule (i.e., the biometric match needs to be successful at each stage). It would be preferable to have a high intraperson correlation and a low (or negative) interperson correlation, so that both stages are likely to pass the watchlist mate of an arriving terrorist or criminal, but at least one of the stages is apt to fail when a legal visitor is matched against a person on the watchlist; e.g., the lower-bound version of the Minutiae-Texture strategy would have achieved a detection probability of 0.963 rather than 0.913 in Table I Nonetheless, it is likely that our lower bound of 0.913 for the Minutiae-Texture strategy is very loose: this bound assumes that Texture's performance on all image qualities is identical to its performance on the 309 Cogent left index prints, which in turn are of significantly worse quality than the quality-8 images used to generate the Minutiae similarity score distributions.
Because we define the fingerprint image quality of a match to be the worse of the quality of the visitor's print and the print on the watchlist, and because Texture is very effective at matching poor-quality prints, the Minutiae-Texture strategy provides robustness against gaming (e.g., deliberately but partially defacing fingerprints before entering the U.S.) by terrorists (e.g., the terrorist has quality-8 images when entering the U.S. but quality-1 images in the watchlist) and poor image acquisition (e.g., the terrorist has quality-1 images when entering the country but, due to suboptimal conditions when acquiring fingerprints in the field, has quality-8 images in the watchlist).
Although adding Face as an additional layer to the Minutiae-Texture strategy does not improve performance, the inclusion of Face with nontrivial (i.e., nonzero) threshold levels would require watchlist visitors to alter their fingerprints and their face to defeat a three-stage strategy. This three-stage strategy would be preferred to the Minutiae-Texture strategy if the increased difficulty in gaming the three-stage strategy more than offsets the reduction in performance of the threestage strategy (relative to the Minutiae-Texture strategy) by imposing nontrivial face threshold levels.
There are several minor caveats about our analysis and the data. The Texture data is based on only 309 left index prints of image quality 8, although statistical noise in these test results
would not be enough to change our qualitative conclusions. All the data are fit with parametric distributions, which causes minor inaccuracies (e.g., compare the results here to those in [2] ) but should not affect our qualitative conclusions. As pointed out in [2] , due to lack of access to Government data, we are not able to calibrate a model that allows different fingers to have different image qualities, and we are not able to assess how these strategies would perform against the actual watchlist and actual visitors, both of which may be of worse image quality than the publicly available databases. However, neither of these shortcomings are likely to change our qualitative conclusions: analysis in [2] suggests that it is reasonably accurate to assume each person has an associated image quality, and the worse the image qualities in the actual system, the more improvement is possible by using the Minutiae-Texture strategy.
There is one major caveat that could affect our qualitative conclusions. Computer vision techniques are changing rapidly, which could dramatically improve the performance of face recognition systems. The goal of the 2005 Face Recognition Grand Challenge [12] was to improve face recognition by an order of magnitude (e.g., for one-to-one matching, 0.98 detection Table I .
Finally, we note that multistage strategies are typically not the optimal way to combine different biometric systems. We consider multistage systems here because of the time constraints on Texture matching. It seems likely that the speed of Texture matching will greatly increase over the coming years. To assess the potential impact of the increased speed, we ignore constraint (3) and consider the lower-bound version of a strategy based on an optimal weighted average (with a different weight for each image quality) of the Minutiae score and Texture score. This strategy achieves a detection probability of 0.927, which is 0.013 higher than the lower-bound version of the Minutiae-Texture strategy. Similar modest improvements are probably also possible by combining Face scores and Minutiae scores using optimal weighted averages or a NeymanPearson scheme [11] .
This study was performed to assess whether a shift from two fingers to ten fingers is the only alternative to fixing the US-VISIT biometric program, which originally had trouble detecting watchlist visitors with poor image quality. It appears that there is an alternative: using the new Texture matching system as the second-stage in a two-stage, two-finger strategy should, if used This appendix contains the mathematical model and analysis that generated the results in the main text. We discuss fingerprint image quality in §1 and estimate the parameters for the intraperson and interperson similarity score distributions for the Minutiae, Face and Texture systems in §2. The optimal Minutiae-Face strategy, Minutiae-Texture strategy, and Minutiae-Face-Texture strategy are derived in §3- §5, respectively. Our basic notation is summarized in Table 1 .
Fingerprint Image Quality
As in [1] , we explicitly model fingerprint image quality and assume that each U.S. visitor and each record on the watchlist has an associated image quality, which is an independent and identically distributed (iid) random variable with generic notation Q, although later we let Q v denote visitor image quality and Q k denote the image quality of the k th record on the watchlist. This quantity can take on one of eight values, where Q = 1 is the best quality and Q = 8 is the worst quality. The probability mass function (pmf) p(i) of Q was derived in [1] using data from [2] , and is reproduced in Table 2 .
Parameter Estimation
To model the performance of a multistage biometric system, we need to estimate the probability distributions associated with the intraperson and interperson similarity scores produced during the matching process in the various stages. As in [1] , we use parametric distribution functions to model the distributions in this paper. We estimate these parameters for the Minutiae system in §2.1, for the Face system in §2.2, and for the Texture system in §2.3.
The Minutiae System
The Minutiae system is the first stage of all the biometric strategies considered in the main text.
In this subsection, we summarize results in [1] , where these distributions were derived, and also estimate new intraperson distribution parameters.
We create a family of probability distributions for intraperson similarity scores with cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) G
i , i=1,. . . ,8, one for each image quality. Although these eight distributions were modeled as gamma distributions in [1] , for reasons that will become clear in §2.3,
we assume in this paper that they are lognormal distributions with probability density functions
i
where µ
is the mean and σ
is the standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution. , which provides best-fit lognormal and gamma distributions, suggests that both distributions fit the data (from §5.13 of [3] ) equally well. We substitute equation (1) into equation (6) of [1] and use the 16 data points in Table 3 of [1] to solve the 16 equations for 16 unknowns and get the parameters µ
i , i = 1, . . . , 8 given in Table 2 .
Following [4] , we assumed in [1] and assume here that the interperson similarity score depends on the qualities of the two matched fingerprints only through the worse of the two qualities. Hence, we define a family of interperson similarity score distributions, one for each image quality, which are lognormal with cdfs H
i , i=1,. . . ,8, and pdfs
whereμ (1) i is the mean andσ (1) i is the standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution. The lognormal assumption stems from an analysis in [1] of raw similarity score data in [3] . Parameter estimation for these distributions was performed in [1] from data in [2] , and the 16 parameter values are reproduced in Table 2 .
The Face System
The Face system uses a visitor's facial scan as the biometric input. Our data source for estimating the probability distributions for the intraperson and interperson similarity scores is NIST's 2002 Face Vendor Recognition Test [5] . We use the verification (i.e., one-to-one matching) performance data for Identix, which is the current vendor for face verification in the US-VISIT Program, reported in Fig. 7 of [5] . In particular, we use three data points on this Receiver Operating Char- Unlike the fingerprint analysis reviewed in §2.1, we have no raw similarity score data to guide the particular choices of probability distributions. To maintain consistency with [1] , we use gamma intraperson distributions and lognormal interperson distributions. Because this data is not disaggregated by image quality of the facial scan, we have one intraperson similarity score distribution,
, and one interperson similarity score distribution, H (f) , where the pdfs are given by
where λ (f) is the shape parameter and θ (f) is the scale parameter of the gamma distribution, and
i is the standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution.
We simultaneously solve the following four equations, which state that the three data points in the previous paragraph are on the ROC curve and the threshold is 1000 for the leftmost point, for the two parameters of G (f) and the two parameters of H (f) :
The resulting intraperson parameter values are
and the interperson parameter values are
To validate our distributional assumptions, we generated a ROC curve based on the gamma and lognormal distributions in (3)- (4) with parameters in (9)- (10), and found that it very accurately reproduced the entire ROC curve in Fig. 7 of [5] (e.g., the maximum vertical deviation of the verification probability was 0.005).
The Texture System
In this subsection, we estimate the probability distributions for intraperson and interperson similarity scores for the Texture fingerprint system. This analysis is more complicated than that in §2.2 because we allow for statistical dependence between the Minutiae similarity score and the Texture similarity score between any two fingers. Although Texture uses a different technology than Minutiae, they both use the same underlying pair of fingerprints, which leads to the dependence.
Because the focus of Texture's development has been to match poor quality fingerprints, the only available data is for image quality 8. We use data supplied by Cogent [6] , who conducted single-finger experiments on 309 left index fingerprints with image quality 8, against a representative (i.e., image quality pmf given by p(i) in Table 2 ) watchlist of size 600. Cogent has two minutiae matchers, called F-matcher and Galaxy, and one texture matcher. F-matcher is currently used in the US-VISIT Program and is the basis for all the data used in [1] and in the Minutiae system in §2.1. Galaxy is newer and slightly better than F-matcher. We only have data to estimate the dependence between the Texture and Galaxy similarity scores, and so we assume that the correlation between Texture and F-matcher is the same as that between Texture and Galaxy. This assumption seems reasonable because F-matcher and Galaxy are based on the same technology.
The raw data consists of two points on the curve for Galaxy and two points on the ROC curve for a weighted average of Texture and Galaxy, where the weighting is 80% Texture plus 20%
Galaxy. This 80-20 mix was found to be the optimal weighted average of Texture and Galaxy for both ROC points (i.e., this weighting maximized the detection probability subject to a specified false positive probability). The two points on the Galaxy ROC curve are a detection probability of 0.5631 at a false positive probability of 0.001 generated by a threshold of 980, and a detection probability of 0.5022 at a false positive probability of 0.0001 generated by a threshold of 1150. The two points on the 80-20 curve are a detection probability of 0.8188 at a false positive probability of 0.001 generated by a threshold of 730, and a detection probability of 0.7573 at a false positive probability of 0.0001 generated by a threshold of 900. Both of the ROC curves have a 600-person watchlist.
Let the random variables X 
8 , X
8 ) has a bivariate lognormal distribution with pdf
where
and ρ is the correlation coefficient of ln x 1 and ln x 2 (e.g., [7] ). Similarly, (Y
8 ) has a bivariate lognormal distribution with pdf h 8 (y 1 , y 2 ) = 1
A bivariate lognormal is more tractable, both analytically and computationally, than a bivariate gamma, which is why we switched the Minutiae intraperson distributions in §2.1 from gamma to lognormal. We have 10 parameters to estimate in (11)- (14), although we only use six of these in our analysis: the Texture marginal parameters (µ
8 ,μ
8 ,σ
8 ) and the two correlation coefficients (ρ 8 ,ρ 8 ), which we assume also hold between Minutiae and Texture.
If we define κ(c, t) = P(cX (1) 
ξ(c, t) = P(cY (1) 
and their partial derivatives
then the data described above can be expressed as 12 equations in terms of the 10 lognormal parameters in (11)-(13) and two Lagrange multipliers, λ 1 and λ 2 . Equations (23)-(30) below stem from the two points on the Galaxy ROC curve and the two points on the 80-20 ROC curve, and equations (31)-(34) below are the first-order conditions [8] arising from the fact that the 80-20 weights maximize the detection probability subject to the false positive probability being less than or equal to 0.001 and 0.0001. If we let the gallery size n = 600 then the 12 equations are
1 − ξ n (0.2, 900) = 0.0001,
Equations (23)- (26) can be solved independently of equations (27)-(34) for the four marginal Galaxy parameters. We first solve (23)-(26) and then substitute these four values into (27)- (34) to solve for the remaining six lognormal parameters and the two Lagrange multipliers. The six lognormal parameters that are used in our analysis are displayed in Table 3 .
Finally, for the set of 309 left index fingerprints from Cogent, we also have two points on the 600-watchlist ROC curve for the F-matcher: a detection probability of 0.5028 at a false positive probability of 0.001 generated by a threshold of 1030, and a detection probability of 0.3845 at a false positive probability of 0.0001 generated by a threshold of 1250. Solving
yields the lognormal parameters for the F-matcher for this set of fingerprints. These parameters are used to derive one of the ROC curves in Fig. 2 of the main text.
The Minutiae-Face Strategy
Now that we have the similarity score distributions associated with various biometric systems, we are ready to model the performance of the multistage strategies considered in the main text. In this section, we consider a two-stage biometric strategy in which the first stage is the Minutiae system and the second stage is the Face system. We assume that a person's intraperson and interperson similarity scores from stage one are independent from the similarity scores in stage two. While this assumption is natural in that face and fingerprints are different biometrics, it does not attempt to capture the behavior of a watchlist person who undergoes face and fingerprint distortion (e.g., surgery) to evade detection.
For a record on the watchlist to be in the visitor's final candidate list, it must pass the Minutiae biometric rule at stage one and then pass the Face biometric rule at stage two. As in [1] , the biometric rule for the Minutiae system is that either the left fingerprint or the right fingerprint similarity score exceeds the single-finger threshold or the sum of the two scores exceeds the twofinger threshold. The output from the Minutiae system is a stage-one candidate list, which then becomes the watchlist for the stage-two Face system. The biometric rule used to place a record from the stage-two watchlist onto the final candidate list is that the similarity score generated from matching the visitor's face to the record's face exceeds the Face threshold.
As in [1] , we allow the Minutiae thresholds to be quality-dependent, that is, in the case of intraperson matching, the thresholds used are those corresponding to the visitor's image quality, and in case of interperson matching, the thresholds used are those corresponding to the worse of the image qualities of the visitor and the record on the watchlist to which the visitor's prints are being matched. We note that even though G (f) and H (f) are independent of fingerprint image quality, we allow the Face threshold used for stage two to depend on the fingerprint image quality obtained during the Minutiae match. The Minutiae single-finger and two-finger thresholds for image quality i are denoted by t 1i an t 2i respectively, and u i is the Face threshold when the match quality during stage one is i. These thresholds are random variables, denoted by T 1 , T 2 and U , that are realized when the quality of the visitor (and the quality of the watchlist person when computing the false positive probabilities) becomes known.
We derive the detection probability and the false positive probability for this two-stage strategy in §3.1 and §3.2, and optimize this strategy in §3.3.
Detection Probability
Let the random variable X i be the event that the illegal visitor (i.e., a person on the watchlist) fails the Minutiae biometric test (i.e., the similarity scores do not exceed the thresholds) given that his image quality
Let X (f) be the intraperson similarity score between a visitor's face and that of its mate on the watchlist, and let A (f) i = {X (f) ≤ U |Q v = i} be the event that the similarity score between the visitor's facial image and his corresponding image on the watchlist does not exceed the Face threshold in the stage-two biometric rule, given that the visitor's fingerprint image quality is i.
Define the probabilities
by equation (6) in the Appendix of [1] , and
Then the overall detection probability for this two-stage strategy for a visitor with image quality i
i ) because the two stages are independent, (45)
False Positive Probability
Let Q v be the fingerprint quality of the visitor and Q k be the quality of the prints of the k th record on the watchlist. Let Ψ k = max(Q v , Q k ) be the worst of the two image qualities. Let Y ik be the event that the matching between the visitor's fingerprints and those of the k th record on the watchlist fails the Minutiae biometric rule given that Ψ k = i, so that
Let Y (f) k be the interperson face similarity score between the visitor and the k th record on the watchlist, and let C
≤ U |Ψ k = i} be the event that the matching between the visitor's facial image and that of the k th record on the watchlist fails the Face biometric rule given that the Ψ k = i. We define the probabilities
by equation (13) in the Appendix of [1] , and
Let B k be the event that the k th record from the watchlist does not enter the final candidate list.
Then the overall false positive probability of this two-stage strategy for a visitor with Q v = i is
Optimization
We define the overall false positive probability f by
Let α be the maximum allowable overall false positive probability (0.0031 in the base case), and let γ be the maximum allowable mean size of the stage-one candidate list for a legal visitor (12, 500 in the base case), which is required to hold regardless of the visitor's image quality. For a legal visitor with image quality i, the size of the stage-one candidate list is a binomial random variable, denoted by N i , with parameters n (the size of the stage-one watchlist) and
Hence, the mean size of the stage-one candidate list is
The optimization problem for the Minutiae-Face strategy is maximize t 11 ,...,t 18 ,t 21 ,...,t 28 ,
As explained in [1] , d 1 = · · · = d 8 and the false positive constraint is tight in the optimal solution.
Thus, problem (60)- (62) 
We solve problem (63)-(66) using MATLAB. The solution is presented in Table 4 .
The Minutiae-Texture Strategy
In this section, we consider a two-stage biometric strategy in which the first stage is the Minutiae system and the second stage is the Texture system. The biometric rule for the first-stage Minutiae system remains the same as in §3 with thresholds t 1i and t 2i . The biometric rule for the Texture system is identical in form to that for the Minutiae system, but with single-finger thresholds u 1i
and two-finger thresholds u 2i ; their corresponding random variables before the image quality is revealed are U 1 and U 2 . In §4.1, we state some results pertaining to the lognormal distribution that are used in §4.2 and §4.3 to derive expressions for the detection probability and false positive probability. The strategy is optimized in §4.4.
Before we derive our results, we address the question of numerical accuracy, which forced us to take a different approach for deriving the false positive probability than was used in [1] and §3.2.
By equation (57), the false positive probability f i , given that visitor image quality is i, can be expressed as
where is the probability that the k th record and the visitor's prints will erroneously match. For the setting considered in [1] and in this paper, f i ≈ 10 −2 (for poor image qualities) and n ≈ 10 7 , implying that ≈ 10 −9 . Our approach in the single-stage strategies in [1] and in the two-stage strategy in §3.2 was to compute 1 − to an absolute error of 10 −16 (machine precision) using MATLAB which resulted in having 7 digits of precision. However, for the two-stage strategy in this section, which requires the evaluation of bivariate lognormal cdfs and the computation of double integrals, it is not feasible to get even a few digits of precision in via the computation of 1− . Hence, in §4.3, we derive an expression for directly and then evaluate it with a relative error of 10 −9 using CUBPACK in MATLAB [10, 11] , which together with the computation of (67) via MATLAB's MAPLE interface in 32-digit precision, achieves the requisite precision. Although this approach is not necessary to compute the detection probability for the Minutiae-Texture strategy, we nonetheless use this approach in §4.2 so as to streamline our presentation; i.e., in §4.2, we directly estimate the detection probability instead of estimating one minus the detection probability, as we did in [1] and §3.1.
Properties of the Lognormal Distribution
Let Z 1 be a lognormal random variable with parameters (µ 1 , σ 1 ) and cdf L 1 (z 1 ). Let Φ(a) denote the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. The result 1−Φ(a) = Φ(−a) ∀a ∈ R implies that
Let S 1 and S 2 be two standard normal random variables with correlation ρ and joint cdf Φ ρ (s 1 , s 2 ). Define S 3 = −S 1 . Then S 3 is also a standard normal random variable and the joint cdf of S 3 and S 2 is Φ −ρ (s 1 , s 2 ), and hence
Now consider Z 1 and Z 2 to be lognormally distributed random variables with parameters (µ 1 , σ 1 ) and (µ 2 , σ 2 ) respectively and joint correlation ρ. Let L 1 (z 1 ) and L 2 (z 2 ) be the respective marginal cdfs and L(z 1 , z 2 ) be the joint cdf. Further, letL(z 1 , z 2 ) be the joint cdf of Z 1 and Z 2 if the correlation was −ρ instead of ρ. Then equation (72) implies that
Finally, let l z 2 (z 1 ) denote the conditional pdf of Z 1 given Z 2 = z 2 . From [7] , we have that
is also a lognormal pdf with mean µ and standard deviation σ of the underlying normal distribution given by
We use this result to ease the computational burden by simplifying double integrals of the following type to single integrals,
where m(z 2 ) is any function of z 2 .
Detection Probability
Let the random variable X Let g i (x 1 , x 2 ) be the joint pdf of (X
l ) given Q v = i, and let g
i (x 1 ) and g (2) i (x 2 ) denote the marginal pdfs given Q v = i. The parameters for these distributions were derived in §2. Let
l ) if the correlation was −ρ instead of ρ. Finally, let g
be the conditional pdf of X 
l ) and (X (1)
r ) have identical joint distributions, and so these pdfs also hold for the right index finger. For these six pdfs, we use similar notation for the corresponding cdfs with 'G' replacing 'g'.
We now define the following events in terms of the random variables introduced above (the subscript i is suppressed here to ease the presentation):
In addition, let D 
We derive d i , which is the detection probability given that the illegal visitor has image quality i, in two steps: first we express d i in terms of the probabilities of the various events in (78)-(83), and then we evaluate these probabilities using the results in §4.1. To perform the first step, we first note that
If we denote the complement of a generic event E by E, then the three expressions on the right side of (85) can be rewritten as
Substituting (86)- (88) into (85) yields
Using the lognormal results in §4.1 and the definitions in (78)- (83), we write the six probabilities on the right side of equation (89) in terms of the relevant intraperson score distributions:
=Ḡ e
=Ḡ e 2µ (1)
Replacing the various expressions derived above into equation (89) for d i and noting that (91) and (102) cancel out with terms in (95) and (105), respectively, we get
False Positive Probability
Consider the matching process between the fingerprints of a legal visitor and those of the k th record on the watchlist. Let Q v be the fingerprint quality of the visitor and Q k be the quality of the prints of the k th record on the watchlist. Let Ψ k = max(Q v , Q k ) be the worst of the two image qualities.
Let the random variable Y 
rk be the left and right interperson Texture similarity scores.
lk ), and let h
i (x 1 ) and h (2) i (x 2 ) be the marginal pdfs. The parameters for these distributions were derived in §2. Leth i (x 1 , x 2 ) be the joint pdf of (Y
lk ) if the correlation was −ρ instead of ρ. Finally, let h 
lk ) and (Y
rk ) have identical joint distributions, and so these pdfs also hold for the right index finger. For these six pdfs, we use similar notation for the corresponding cdfs with As in §4.2, we define the following events in terms of the random variables introduced above (the subscript i is suppressed here to ease the presentation):
Let E
k be the event that fingerprints of the legal visitor and the fingerprints of the k th record pass the Minutiae biometric rule, and let E
k be the corresponding event for the Texture system.
In contrast to the events D
i and D
i defined in §4.2, the events E
k and E
k are not conditioned on image quality, and are given by E
(1)
lk +Y (2) rk ≥ U 2 )}. If we define η j to be P(E
, then the false positive probability given that Q v = i is
Note that η i can also be written as P(E (1) k Ψ k = i) + P(E (2) k Ψ k = i) − P(E (1) k ∪ E 
The solution to problem (123)-(126) appears in Table 5 . The solution to the lower bound version of this problem (see main text for details) appears in Table 6 . In addition to using MATLAB, we use the code provided by Alan Genz [9] on his website to compute bivariate lognormal cdfs, and use CUBPACK [10] and the MATLAB toolbox associated with CUBPACK [11] to compute double intergals.
1 − G (f) (u i ) times the right side of equation (106). The false positive probability for a legal visitor with image quality i is
where, δ i equals H (1 − η
The reduced optimization problem is 
The optimal solution to (129)-(132) reveals that adding Face to the lower bound Minutiae-Texture strategy does not improve the detection probability: the Face threshold levels are essentially zero, rendering this stage redundant (i.e., the detection probability and the false positive probability are one). Consequently, we do not present the detailed numerical results for the Minutiae-Face-Texture strategy. 
i ) lognormal parameters for the Minutiae system. The (p i ) values are taken from Table 2 in the Appendix of [1] and the (μ
i ,σ
i ) entries are taken from Table 6 
8 , σ
8 ) and interperson (μ
8 ,σ Table 6 : Results for the lower bound version of the Minutiae-Texture strategy, including the optimal threshold values, and the detection probability, false positive probability and mean candidate list for each visitor image quality.
